Understanding managerial behaviour during initial steps of a clinical information system adoption by Rodríguez, Charo & Pozzebon, Marlei
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Understanding managerial behaviour during
initial steps of a clinical information system
adoption
Charo Rodríguez
1* and Marlei Pozzebon
2
Abstract
Background: While the study of the information technology (IT) implementation process and its outcomes has
received considerable attention, the examination of pre-adoption and pre-implementation stages of configurable IT
uptake appear largely under-investigated. This paper explores managerial behaviour during the periods prior the
effective implementation of a clinical information system (CIS) by two Canadian university multi-hospital centers.
Methods: Adopting a structurationist theoretical stance and a case study research design, the processes by which
CIS managers’ patterns of discourse contribute to the configuration of the new technology in their respective
organizational contexts were longitudinally examined over 33 months.
Results: Although managers seemed to be aware of the risks and organizational impact of the adoption of a new
clinical information system, their decisions and actions over the periods examined appeared rather to be driven by
financial constraints and power struggles between different groups involved in the process. Furthermore, they
largely emphasized technological aspects of the implementation, with organizational dimensions being put aside.
In view of these results, the notion of ‘rhetorical ambivalence’ is proposed. Results are further discussed in relation
to the significance of initial decisions and actions for the subsequent implementation phases of the technology
being configured.
Conclusions: Theoretical and empirically grounded, the paper contributes to the underdeveloped body of
literature on information system pre-implementation processes by revealing the crucial role played by managers
during the initial phases of a CIS adoption.
Background
The purpose of this investigation was to examine the
initial phases of a joint clinical information system (CIS)
implementation in two Canadian university and multi-
hospital health centres. The adoption of new informa-
tion technologies (IT) currently constitutes one of the
major institutional pressures on health care delivery sys-
tems. Health care organizations display information-
intensive business processes wherein health profes-
sionals strive to keep abreast of the best possible medi-
cal knowledge [1]. At the same time, contemporary
health care delivery involves an increasing degree of
complexity, which becomes more and more difficult
when using paper medical records [2]. In this context,
the purchase and implementation of computerized
information systems constitutes a major strategic deci-
sion, largely sustained in this sector by the assumption
that IT should facilitate and improve the quality of
healthcare delivery and overall organizational perfor-
mance [3-5].
Being behind other industries with regard to IT diffu-
sion [6], the degree of acquisition and use of IT in the
health sector varies according to the type of technology
and health care facility. In hospital settings, information
systems still mainly address administrative purposes
[7,8]. When developed, clinical IT solutions have been
customized and discrete, “in-house” solutions that lead
to fragmented patient information, often not readily
accessible at the point of care. An intricate network of
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the pervasive trend towards integration, encouraging
people in the health sector to see highly complex
packages such as clinical information system (CIS) as
crucial to their business processes [9].
A CIS is presented as advanced configurable and inte-
grated package software. Configurable refers to technol-
ogies that are highly parameterizable, that is they are
built up from a range of components to meet the very
specific requirements of a particular organization
[10,11]. Integrated concerns the technology ability to
put together and make accessible all the clinical infor-
mation across the hospital. In other words, a CIS has
been defined as the health care information system
designed to incorporate and manage the clinical infor-
mation pertinent to the delivery of patient care, includ-
ing elements such as order entries, results reporting,
care planning and clinical documentation [12].
Despite its potential benefits, successful CIS projects
are scarce [13,14]. In fact, accounts about the failure of
CIS implementations are quite common, and this
regardless of the methodological care and/or high finan-
cial resources invested in their development [15-17]. As
it has been pointed out, CIS adoptions are likely to fail
when they are seen as “purely technical implementa-
tions” instead of complex social implementations, and/
or when organizational and political issues have been
neglected [18-22].
The study of the IT implementation process and its
outcomes has received a lot of attention in the informa-
tion system (IS) research field since the 1980s [23,24].
However, the examination of pre-adoption and pre-
implementation stages of configurable IT uptake, i.e. the
phases preceding the go-live and use of a new informa-
tion system, and their possible repercussions to the suc-
cess or failure of its whole implementation process,
appear largely under-investigated [25]. For instance,
Herold et al. [26] suggest that the perceptions and atti-
tudes developed during the pre-implementation phase
will strongly influence the other phases of the project,
sometimes with huge negative consequences. Also, Poz-
zebon and Pinsonneault [27] draw attention to the criti-
cal influence that initial organizational decisions have on
the trajectories built up by consultants and clients dur-
ing a configurable package implementation. From a var-
iance perspective, Abdinnour-Helm et al. [28] note in
contrast that time with the firm and position, more than
high levels of pre-implementation involvement, have a
greater impact on attitudes towards an enterprise
resource planning (ERP) implementation. Indeed, a bet-
ter understanding of IT pre-implementation phases and
its consequences for the chain of events that will follow
the go-live appears to be necessary [29].
This paper aims to bridge this gap, in particular con-
cerning CIS projects. Accordingly, the question that
guided the investigation was stated as follows: How do
CIS stakeholders initiate and set up the new CIS? In
other words, our objective was to identify the decisions
and actions undertaken by top managers and other key
CIS actors in order to select and prepare the effective
implementation of a new CIS in two complex organiza-
tions, and to understand the intended and unintended
consequences provoked by such decisions over two
initial periods: CIS selection (or pre-adoption) and pre-
implementation (see also Figure 1). We also examine
the connections between the selection and pre-imple-
mentation phases, a subject virtually absent in the
literature.
A structurationist theoretical framework
Structuration theory has been extensively adopted by IS
researchers over the last 20 years [30]. At the time of its
formulation, Giddens’ structuration theory [31] provided
an account of the constitution of social life that chal-
lenged established theoretical positions and traditions
[32]. Giddens departed from the conceptualization of
s t r u c t u r ea ss o m eg i v e no re x t e r n a lf o r m .S t r u c t u r ei s
what gives form and shape to social life, but it is not
itself the form and shape. Structure exists only in and
through the activities of human agents [31]. Similarly,
he departed from the idea of agency as something just
“contained” within the individual; agency refers to the
flow or pattern of people’s actions. As Walsham notes
[33], Giddens thus deeply reformulated the notions of
structure and agency, emphasizing that “action, which
has strongly routinized aspects, is both conditioned by
existing cultural structures and also creates and recre-
ates those structures through the enactment process”.
He suggested that while structural properties of societies
and social systems are real, they have no physical exis-
tence. Instead, they depend upon regularities of social
reproduction [34]. As a consequence, the basic domain
of study in the social sciences consists of social practices
ordered across space and time.
The same can be argued regarding the study of tech-
nological artefacts: technology is active only through
human action. Accordingly, each CIS configuration deci-
sion is not merely technical, but social and political,
affecting end-users’ practices. In order to favour their
acceptance, managers responsible for CIS implementa-
tions should therefore be conscious of the consequences
of their technical choices on organizational practices.
Furthermore, as noted previously, people (particularly
physicians and other clinicians) who will be affected by
such decisions should be listened to and truly involved
in the entire process.
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intervene in such contexts because it takes these con-
cerns into account (see Figure 2). During the process of
a new CIS configuration, knowledgeable CIS managers,
able to reflect on their own and others’ behaviour, will
mobilize interpretive schemes, resources and norms in
order to set up a collection of intentional and interde-
pendent decisions and actions regarding future CIS
operation. Each decision regarding the CIS configuration
may have intended and unintended consequences, due
to the fact that CIS managers, as human agents, always
operate in a situation of bounded knowledgeability. The
social nature of the CIS, or, in Orlikowski’s terms [35],
the enacted structures of the CIS-in-practice will thus
progressively emerge from CIS stakeholders’ decisions
and (inter)actions, then recursively affect future CIS
managers’ decisions and actions concerning CIS adop-
tion, and ultimately day-to-day clinical practices [36].
Methods
Using Stake’s typology [37], this is a collective case
study, each multi-hospital system being a case. Consid-
ering that longitudinal research appears to be crucial for
attaining a rich understanding of organizational change
[38], this inquiry is better labelled a longitudinal collec-
tive case study. Appropriate ethical approval for the
enquiry was obtained by the competent Institutional
Review Board.
For the project phases under examination, i.e. CIS
selection and pre-implementation, two complementary
sources of data have been used: documents and archival
material, and participant observations. The first method
examines documents mainly comprised of the minutes
of 41 meetings of CIS implementation committees that
took place in the hospitals from the beginning of the
CIS project in October 2001 to the end of the pre-
implementation phase in June 2004 - 27 meetings of the
CIS committee at the MHOSP1, and 14 meetings of the
CIS committee at the MHOSP2. Moreover, archival
material comprised of other organizational texts distrib-
uted before, during and after these meetings, such as
CIS project management plan, CIS schemes of govern-
ance structure, working papers, and vendor’s milestones
were also examined.
The second method, participant observation, mainly
concerns our regular attendance at these CIS implemen-
tation committee meetings at each hospital. Members of
these committees were aware of who we were and the
purpose of our investigation before accepting our pre-
sence at the meetings. Further, this has been a long-term
full participant observation, in which we strike a balance
in our role as pure observers with that of participants in
the discussions [39]. The adoption of this method for
more than two-and-a-half years has constituted a privi-
leged opportunity for studying these groups of CIS man-
agers in depth: it has allowed us access to a holistic view
of the dynamic within their successive meetings, as well
as of subjects’ interactions within their particular com-
mittee settings. Indeed, our intensive diary notes have
completed the body of texts considered in the study.
Two strategies have been used for analyzing textual
data: discursive thematic analysis [40] and temporal
bracketing strategy, the latest being considered a direct
reference to Giddens’ structuration theory [41]. Accord-
ingly, we have first selected and described local pieces of
texts and then we have interpreted them according to
themes (or discursive “types”) specific to the fields of IT
and/or health services and policy - for instance, “end-
users’ involvement”,o r“CIS budgetary constraints”.
Drawing on other complementary texts from the con-
text (e.g. governmental documents, newspapers), our
prior knowledge of the institutional context within
which these multi-hospitals evolved, and significantly,
on our diary notes, we have elaborated a plausible expla-
n a t i o n ,t r y i n gt ou n d e r s t a n dt h ep o w e rr e l a t i o n st h a t
underlie the production of those particular texts within
 CIS Adoption              CIS Pilot Studies 
CIS Selection  CIS Pre-implementation     
Pre-adoption  Pre-implementation  Implementation  Post-implementation 
(Adapted from Herold et al., 1995)
Figure 1 CIS adoption and implementation timeline.
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Such systematic analysis across the corpus of texts
allowed us to identify the decisions and actions that,
over the period examined, have contributed to shaping
the CIS to be implemented - see Table 1 for an illustra-
tion of this analytical procedure. Then, by bracketing
this discursive activity over time, we have been able to
examine how discourses have cumulatively contributed
to the structuring of a new technological solution within
an organization, i.e., how discourses in one period help
to make sense of reality and lead to legitimated deci-
sions and actions that influence the configuration being
developed [27].
Results
The CIS Project: Institutional Context and Project
Stakeholders
MHOSP1 and MHOSP2 are the two biggest university
multi-hospitals akin the Quebec public health care
system. In response to their multiple missions –i.e. spe-
cialized care delivery, research, and teaching– MHOSP1
and MHOSP2 have developed an impressive number of
in-house and disconnected IT solutions and databases
over the years. The need to acquire an integrated CIS
had therefore been perceived in both university hospitals
for years. However, the huge investment that such an
acquisition represents had prevented its purchase. In
such constraining circumstances, the decision to jointly
adopt the same new CIS, made in fall 2001, was encour-
aged by the initial budget that a strategic research pro-
gram, called here the “Rainbow Program”, was ready to
provide. Launched in July 2000 by the Canadian Foun-
dation for Innovation (a federal research funding
agency) over seven years, the Rainbow Program joins
the efforts of research, clinical care and information ser-
vices communities of several university hospitals in
Quebec, in collaboration with various government agen-
cies and private organizations. Its main goal is to create
CIS 
MANAGERS’ 
DECISIONS 
AND 
(INTER)ACTIONS 
 
ENACTED 
STRUCTURES OF 
CIS IN 
PRACTICE 
The duality of 
the structure 
Reflexive monitoring 
of conduct 
Intended 
and unintended 
consequences 
Interpretive schemes 
Resources 
Norms 
Figure 2 A structurationist view of a CIS implementation.
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Page 4 of 13a clinical repository, a research data warehouse, and sev-
eral research integration tools at the provincial level.
The Rainbow Program - powerful in terms of material
resources (a CDN $28 million program) and legitimacy
within the provincial clinical and research community
(it involves 15 clinical research groups and about 50
researchers) - requires an integrated information system
for the entire health care network in order to develop
its provincial data warehouse for clinical and health
population research (its main objective). Indeed, the CIS
project can be seen as part of the Rainbow Program.
Nevertheless, due to the fact that the CIS is managed by
MHOSP1 and MHOSP2 actors, the CIS project has
always been presented by CIS top management as their
initiative, whose main objective is the clinical manage-
ment of patient data at an individual level, i.e. the adop-
tion of an electronic medical record. In other words, the
bargaining position of the CIS top management vis-à-vis
the Rainbow Program is one of complementary partner-
ship (i.e. interdependency), both being intertwined and
needing each other in order to attain their respective
goals: the former provides the data that the Rainbow
Program needs for its provincial warehouse, and the lat-
ter brings material resources ($5 million per hospital)
and increases the legitimacy of the CIS project.
Our involvement in the field for 33 months has
enabled us to identify three main groups of CIS stake-
holders (see Table 2). The first group is made up of the
CIS top managers in each hospital, that is the Director
of the CIS project, who holds an “umbrella” position
over both multi-hospitals; CIS project managers from
MHOSP1 and MHOSP2; and the chairs of the each
institution’s CIS committees, in operation since October
2001 and January 2003 respectively. The second group
is composed of the members of each CIS committee:
departmental managers from the different sites of each
multi-hospital system, as well as clinical representatives
(physicians and nurses) and managers from ancillary
services, such as archives. Finally, the third group con-
sists of the representatives of the Rainbow Program,
who participate only in CIS committee’sm e e t i n g sa t
MHOSP1.
In the next sections, we present the description of the
cases and our interpretations of how CIS managers, at
each hospital, make sense of their organizational reality
regarding the new CIS and how initial and ongoing
decisions and actions influence the configuration being
developed.
MHOSP1 - The struggle between external pressures and
organizational issues
The CIS project in MHOSP1 has been complex since
the very beginning. In this hospital, CIS top managers’
discursive practices, decisions and actions undertaken
during the period prior to the CIS implementation sug-
gest that, although aware of the impact and risks of the
adoption of a new CIS on their organization, which will
change flows of information and work practices, they
have moved aside important organizational issues being
raised by other CIS committee members, their decisions
having been driven more by financial constraints and
external interests. For a detailed depiction of these pro-
cesses, we have broken down the first 33 months of the
CIS journey in MHOSP1 into two major periods and
five consecutive sub-periods.
The CIS Pre-adoption Period
October 2001-June 2002: Defining local requirements
and interfacing with other hospital information sys-
tems The selection phase of the CIS, led by CIS top
managers from the MHOSP1 informatics department,
Table 1 Illustration of discursive thematic analytical procedure
Setting Piece of text Description theme Explanation
MHOSP1 “[Dr. X] reiterated the need to have a Clinical
Informatics group for the CIS, otherwise he
feels that over time the CIS will lack in
content if there is no continued input from
clinicians.”
This physician is proposing and
arguing in favour of the creation
of a clinical informatics group in
the hospital
CLINICAL
MEANING
OF THE
CIS
This physician is very conscious of the
importance of involving clinicians at this
moment of the CIS project in order to give
clinical meaning to the new system. He is
advocating for the strength and legitimacy
of local knowledge, which will support CIS
acceptance in the hospital. However,
although this proposal seems well accepted
by certain members of the committee, CIS
top managers have decided to postpone it
to future CIS implementation phases.
MHOSP2 “There are worries regarding the CIS adoption
and the current management practices of
access, the single sign-on, etc.”
Discussion about the impact of
new CIS on current
organizational practices
CIS
IMPACT
ON
PRACTICES
This is a very animated discussion about the
future impact of the CIS on current
administrative and clinical practices on this
hospital. Most of the members of the
committee agree on the importance of this
issue. However, discussions do not go
beyond the highlighting of the importance
of this issue.
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applied in order to favour a bottom-up process of iden-
tification of CIS requirements and facilitate a request for
proposals according to clinical practices in use. First, an
on-line 500-item questionnaire was mailed through their
intranet to the more than 2,000 clinicians working in
MHOSP1. The response rate was only 12%, with 93% of
those reporting a positive attitude towards physician
order entry (POE), and 76 clinicians volunteering to par-
ticipate in focus groups (Meeting #3: January 18, 2002).
In February 2002, 11 focus groups for detailing require-
ments were carried out. From the beginning, the low
response rate to the questionnaire and the difficulties
encountered in staffing focus groups echoed the diffi-
culty of involving end-users in the CIS project. In any
case, questions from the focus groups were compiled
and organized for inclusion in the functional require-
ments document.
The complexity of interfacing the new CIS with exist-
ing information systems and the more than 300 data-
bases in MHOSP1 necessitated an ‘interfacing and
transition team’, which produced a document “that
details the CIS interfacing requirements. This document
gives a high level view of interfaces required prior, dur-
ing and after various phases of the CIS” (Meeting #4:
March 15, 2002). CIS top managers considered a techni-
cal focus emphasis of interfacing enough at this particu-
lar moment of the CIS adoption. Noting that “sites work
differently sometimes”, committee members’ highlighted
potential challenges (the emergency department) and
alleged organizational implications to integration. CIS
top management felt that “this was more an implemen-
tation issue than a request for proposals issue” (Meeting
#5: April 19, 2002).
Another important issue discussed during the first
sub-period of CIS adoption concerned the need for
MHOSP1 to structure a permanent clinical information
department to give meaningful clinical content to the
CIS configuration. A physician, working in the hospital
but attending CIS committee meetings as a researcher
representative of the Rainbow Program, repeatedly
raised this point.
“[Dr. X] shared his concern that at the MHOSP1
there is no Clinical Informatics group. He feels that
this group should be a department (something that
is permanent) not a committee. This group should
be composed of multi-disciplinary and multi-profes-
sional users. This type of department would be
required before we go live with a CIS. Many partici-
pants in the group were in agreement.” (Meeting #3:
January 18, 2002)
We consider that this issue is crucial in order to
define the norms regulating the meaningful use of the
CIS, and also to reinforce the local knowledge of CIS
end-users vis-à-vis the global knowledge usually
imposed by CIS vendors and external consultants. How-
ever, and despite the fact that most CIS committee
members agreed upon this proposition, top managers
cited funding constraints to postpone the issue to the
implementation phase. As a result, the CIS was initially
conceived as a purely technical device, the construction
of its clinical meaning being postponed to subsequent
phases of the CIS Project.
July 2002-March 2003: Selecting the vendor and wor-
rying about funds A Selection Task Force composed of
10 clinicians (physicians, nurses and allied health profes-
sionals) was created with the mandate of evaluating the
32 responses to the request for proposals according to
four categories: technical infrastructure and interfaces,
security, reports, and business proposal. Three of 32 met
the minimum requirements (including technical as well
as clinical, administrative, research and teaching require-
ments) and maximum cost allowance. Formal demon-
strations took place in January 2003. The CIS vendor was
selected by CIS top managers in March 2003, an event
that marked the end of the pre-adoption phase.
Although the dominant issue during this sub-period
was the selection of the CIS vendor, many concerns
Table 2 CIS top managers
Groups Description How they are
referred in the text
First group: 1. CIS Project Director CIS Director
CIS Project Top Managers 2. CIS Project Managers (one from MHOSP1 and one from MHOSP2). They have the technical
knowledge on the management of information systems projects
CIS Project Managers
3. CIS Project Committees’ Chairs in each MHOSP They have the organizational knowledge
and legitimacy for coordinating the CIS project
CIS Committee Chairs
Second group: CIS Project
Committee Members
4. Clinical representatives (e.g. physicians and nurses), departmental managers from the
different sites of each multi-hospital system, and managers from ancillary services (e.g.
archives)
CIS members
Third group: External Actors 5. Representatives of the Rainbow Program (only participating in MHOSP1 CIS Committee
meetings)
Rainbow Program
representatives
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chase of the system and the costs of its implementation
became more and more explicit, raised in particular by
nursing staff around the table:
“Many users have great concerns about the financing
of the CIS. For the proper integration and imple-
mentation of a CIS, fundsm u s tb em a d er e a d i l y
available not only to purchase CIS software but also
for process re-engineering, training, equipment (PCs,
printers, etc.), extra resources, etc. The user commu-
nity has yet to see a firm commitment from upper
management of MHOSP1 indicating that funds will
be made available for the proper implementation of
the CIS.” (Meeting #9: August 16, 2002)
Indeed, discourses regarding cost issues also domi-
nated this second sub-period of CIS pre-adoption. CIS
is a very costly IT, so top managers selected their CIS
with the best balance between minimum organizational
requirements and maximum cost allowance in view.
Nevertheless, a CIS implementation cost involves not
only the cost of the technology itself, but also the cost
of training and organizational change that its adoption
implies. Focusing on technological aspects of CIS adop-
tion, the discussion about these organizational costs
was, again, postponed by top CIS managers to following
phases of the project.
The CIS Pre-implementation Period
April-October 2003: Striving for funds and working
on the CIS project plan Once the CIS selection (or
pre-adoption) phase was finished, an unexpectedly long
pre-implementation stage began. Contract negotiations
began and the definition of the project scope was under-
taken at each MHOSP. These processes were heavily
tainted by the struggle to obtain a clear budgetary com-
promise from hospital upper management for the CIS
once it was already selected.
The battle for financial resources for the CIS led to the
elaboration by CIS top managers of three different bud-
getary scenarios: Plan A, advance funding from the bud-
get for a new MHOSP1 site; Plan B, a 10-year loan
authorization; and Plan C, funds from the hospital foun-
dation (Meeting #20: September 2003). At the same
time, a global budget increase from CDN $15 M to $17
M per site was accepted by hospital upper management,
and funding from the Rainbow Program of $3.4 M in
the first year of implementation remained secured
(Meeting # 21: October 10, 2003). No clear decision
regarding the source of the bulk of the CIS budget was
made at that time. These were the circumstances that
progressively placed the CIS stakeholders in a very diffi-
cult position regarding the resources needed for success-
ful CIS adoption. Concerning the scope of the CIS
implementation project, three major phases were
defined: Phase 1 included ‘results reporting’ and ‘data
warehouse’; Phase 2 consisted of piloting the project in
1 or 2 clinical programs for ‘order entry’ and ‘clinical
notes’; finally, Phase 3 concerned rapid ‘order entry
deployment’ and a more gradual ‘clinical notes deploy-
ment’ (Meeting #17: May 16, 2003). A few weeks later,
clinical documentation deployment was segregated to a
fourth Phase (Meeting #18: June 6, 2003).
From our examination of this process, it appears that
CIS managers did not adequately connect the selection
and pre-implementation phases: there appeared to be no
plan to use the information gathered from the users to
legitimate the selection in order to facilitate the fit with
the system’s functionalities. Clinicians’ strong resistance
to the introduction of a new CIS is well documented in
the literature and is cited as one of the strongest contri-
butors to CIS failure. In order to deal with this, strate-
gies for end-users’ involvement are strongly advocated
[23,24]. In MHOSP1, this issue is often mentioned by
CIS committee members, who repeatedly seek economic
incentives to support physicians’ involvement in the pro-
ject and request careful analysis and discussion of the
changes that will impact physicians’ and nurses’ prac-
tices over the different phases of the CIS implementa-
tion. However, always alleging budgetary constraints,
CIS top managers put off this discussion about physi-
cians’ involvement until the implementation phase.
Indeed, the analysis of CIS top managers’ discursive
practices suggests they were much more concerned with
the expected outcomes of the CIS than with the process
of its adoption. Furthermore, they seem to lead the issue
of end-users’ involvement in a purely instrumental way:
focusing on user involvement is important to increase
the chances of project success and then to satisfy the
needs of Rainbow Program members,a sa p p e a r si l l u -
strated by the following excerpt:
“The CFI [Canadian Foundation for Innovation] is
providing funds to the [Rainbow Program]. However,
it is a high-risk project and the CFI will benchmark
i t se v o l u t i o n ,a sw e l la st h eC I SP r o j e c ti nt h a t
regard. Since point-of-care data collection is neces-
sary for the [Rainbow Program], the CIS needs to
feed research with this detailed data. This is the
essence of the [Rainbow Program]. Hence, for clini-
cal notes, a specialized [Rainbow Program] front-end
has to be integrated into the CIS. This needs to be
part of the initial roll out (Phase 1) if we do not
know to lose the funding from CFI.” [Meeting #17:
May 16, 2003]
November 2003-January 2004: Negotiating the con-
tract with the vendor Contractual agreements with the
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constraints. In this context, questions relative to time-
line and the scope of services to be provided by the ven-
dor were discussed. The issue of the intellectual
property of the system also attracted great attention:
“[CIS top manager] indicated that for the changes
for research, the idea will belong to the researcher
but the incarnation of these ideas into the [CIS] pro-
duct will then belong to [the vendor]. [CIS top man-
ager] indicated that lawyers have looked into this
issue and that for [the vendor] this is a showstopper.
They will not sign a contract if it means that
MHOSP1 and MHOSP2 will get royalties from the
sales of their [CIS] product to other customers.”
[Meeting #22; November 14, 2003])
In addition, the vendor privileged a “vanilla” CIS imple-
mentation mode, meaning that the software is taken as is,
and a maximum of 30% customization would be tolerated.
In this situation, the fit with the software will be achieved
by changing user practices. Making such changes is always
risky and complex, particularly when it involves harmoniz-
ing local practices with those of a quite different organiza-
tional culture [42]. These initial management decisions
create a scenario in which careful rethinking of business
practices and changes in management will be necessary in
order to achieve standardization, not only internally, but
also across the different hospital sites and institutions. Our
fieldwork also suggests that, although CIS committee
members repeatedly raised the issue of the need to com-
pile a list of business processes to be “re-engineered” from
the early moments of the selection phase, a careful discus-
sion of how and when this would occur was always post-
poned by CIS top management.
At the end of this sub-period, and again mainly due to
budgetary constraints, the envisioned structural proper-
ties of the CIS to be implemented included a contrac-
tual imperative of at least 70% CIS standardization in
both hospitals (outcomes). Discussion on the processes
through which the respective organizations had to
reconsider their current business practices, however,
was still relegated to future phases of the project.
February-June 2004: Critical power struggle between
external and internal CIS stakeholders What signifi-
cantly increases the complexity of the CIS project in the
MHOSP1 setting is the presence of an explicit “battle”
between internal and external actors: between CIS man-
agers and Rainbow Program representatives. The former
sought autonomy vis-à-vis the latter, and emphasized the
meaning of the CIS for the hospital at the individual clini-
cal level (i.e. electronic medical record). For the latter, the
CIS had no individual meaning, but just meaning as a tool
for aggregating data at clinical and population levels (i.e.
as data repository). The battle of interests, present from
the beginning of the CIS project, intensified during the
sub-period prior to signing the contract with the vendor.
In this sense, and due to the lack of budget for the whole
CIS project implementation, a ‘reduced scope’ was envi-
saged, favoured mainly by external CIS stakeholders:
“The funding of [the Rainbow Program] ends in March
2006 and the [Rainbow Program] must have some-
thing to show, such as data flow, research data study,
etc. With this in mind, we could sign a reduced scope
contract with [the vendor] so that we get an early
start. The reduced scope would be a scaling down of
the project for research only. This scaled down scope
still needs to be worked out so as to clearly identify
how we would proceed with the deployment to the
wards and the clinics for the [Rainbow Program] only.”
(Meeting # 23: February 23, 2004)
A new phase, called Phase 1A, was then established
and added to the contract with the vendor. However:
“It is indicated that the lengthy negotiations between
[the Rainbow Program] and MHOSP1/MHOSP2 was
becoming a problem for [the vendor]. [...] There is
more and more pressure to sign a reduced scope
contract between [the vendor] and the 2 MHOSPs
whether the [Rainbow Program] contract is signed
or not. [...] [The Rainbow Program’s representative]
indicated that [the Rainbow Program] wants to parti-
cipate directly in all discussions between [the ven-
dor] and the 2 MHOSPs if things are to move
forward faster.” (Meeting #26: May 14, 2004)
As a result, MHOSP1 was placed in a clear dependent
position vis-à-vis the Rainbow Program (i.e. external CIS
stakeholders) during the weeks before signing the con-
tract with the vendor. MHOSP1 depended, on the one
hand, on the Rainbow Program for funds and on the
other, on the CIS vendor for global CIS knowledge.
Furthermore, this dependency on external CIS stake-
holders had to be added to the lack of internal mobiliza-
tion of CIS end-users. Indeed, the signing of the
contract between both MHOSPs and the CIS vendor
took place in June 2004, before the signing of the con-
tract with the Rainbow Program in July 2004, thanks to
a bank loan that would allow CIS hospital top managers
to undertake the implementation of Phase 1A, while
waiting for funds for the whole CIS project.
MHOSP2 - The “easy-going” battle between IT analysts
and business managers
Compared to the power struggles at MHOSP1, quite a
different scenario was found at MHOSP2. First, the CIS
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weeks before the CIS selection. Second, the absence of
external actors –the Rainbow Program representatives
participated only in MHOSP1 meetings– attenuated the
power struggles, because here there were fewer conflict-
ing interests. In MHOSP2, we have broken down the
period examined into three bracketed sub-periods.
The CIS Pre-adoption Period
January-March 2003: The CIS selection process The
discussions held during the first meetings of the CIS
committee in MHOSP2 mainly involved monitoring the
CIS selection ("The process of CIS selection is still
going on, so the final decision is not made yet.” [Meet-
ing #2a: February 26, 2003]). Along with this, members
of this committee expressed, from the beginning, their
concern about the impact of the CIS adoption on their
business processes, as illustrated in the following excerpt:
“There are worries regarding the CIS adoption and
the current management practices of access, the sin-
gle sign-on, etc. A discussion is held around current
work on a number of applications. The preferred
strategy is the following: the CIS utilization to inte-
grate clinical information rather than the implemen-
tation of a single sign-on technology for a set of
applications.” (Meeting #2a: February 26, 2003)
In sum, the pre-adoption phase of the CIS was shorter
and less complex in this hospital than in MHOSP2.
Indeed, most of the work with regard to the CIS selec-
tion was made by the CIS top managers of this hospital
in collaboration with their counterparts in MHOSP1,
prior the creation of the MHOSP2 CIS planning
committee.
The CIS Pre-implementation Period
April 2003-January 2004: Negotiating with the vendor
and analyzing work practices Once the CIS was
selected, MHOSP2 actively participated in the process of
negotiation with the vendor. In this sense, CIS budget-
ary uncertainty and delays due to changes at the politi-
cal government level were highlighted as puzzling:
“Negotiations advance slowly. Certain crucial points
remain unclear, in particular the date when the
French version of the system will be available. In
addition, the members of the committee are worried
regarding funds. This appears very problematic, par-
ticularly within the context of the current budgetary
exercise at MHOSP2 and the political context tied
to the change in provincial government.” (Meeting
#7a: May 28, 2003)
During the CIS committee meetings at MHOSP2, it
appeared clear that, although external legitimacy and
image were important aspects of the CIS project, CIS
top managers were much more concerned with their
internal needs. Their stated purpose was to implement a
CIS that will provide accurate clinical information and
help improve clinical activities. Despite such concerns, a
critical element emerging from the project was the need
to harmonize the CIS package to at least 70% of the
other sites. The organizational and political impact to
do so appeared to be, at this moment, underestimated.
For instance, CIS committee members’ discursive prac-
tices during this sub-period showed a high concern with
the possible effects of such high standardization on
users’ day-to-day practices and on how end-users might
react to these changes. Nevertheless, no clear plan to
deal with these organizational issues at an operational
level was discussed. Still, such concerns sometimes
appeared to be trivialized:
“[The vendor] agrees to an important reduction,
which brings them to the same monetary level of
their initial offer, although the scope of the project
is now much more important than that included in
the proposition. One of the conditions of this reduc-
tion is that 70% of the system must be identical for
MHOSP2 and MHOSP1. [The CIS project director]
indicates that the hospital CEO does not see any
inconvenience to this constraint.” (Meeting #9a: Sep-
tember 24, 2003).
February-June 2004: The battle for funds and the
search for physician involvement As noted previously,
the issue of end-user involvement, and particularly that
of physicians, was constantly discussed in the MHOSP2
meetings, especially once the decision to undertake
Phase 1A was made. The committee decided to focus
on physicians and other health professionals, members
of the clinical unit pilots, in the reduced-scope CIS
implementation. Top managers were also very con-
cerned with strategies of communication, apparently
aware that distorted messages can be very detrimental
to the future acceptance of the CIS.
In addition, the battle for funds continued. Although
the Rainbow Program representatives never attended
MHOSP2 CIS committee meetings, these negotiations
had a great impact on committee discussions. Indeed,
when support from upper management was obtained for
funds in Phase 1A –in other words, when they reached
a greater bargaining power– MHOSP2 favoured signing
the contract despite unresolved misunderstandings with
the Rainbow Program:
“MHOSP2 has already obtained the support from its
Board of Governors in order to request the budget
necessary for Phase 1A, and is seriously considering
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ing for the conclusions of the negotiations with [the
Rainbow Program]. It is not clear at this moment if
MHOSP1 will be able to do so. A last chance meet-
ing will take place with [the Rainbow Program] on
Friday, May 29.” (Meeting #14a: May 26, 2004)
Discussion
In contrast to functionalist social theory, which dilutes
human agency under the deterministic effect of social
structure, Giddens’ structuration theory explicitly
enhances social actors’ intentionality, knowledgeability
and reflexivity: human agents have reasons for acting as
they do, although such purposeful behaviour involves
unintended consequences regarding the recursively-
related social structure, which in turn will affect future
conduct. As Giddens notes, it is the examination of “the
follow of intentional conduct” that allows us to foresee
and explain possible future “unintended consequences”
of our actions [31].
When applying these ideas in the present project, we
can therefore state that CIS top managers’ flow of deci-
sions and actions during the CIS selection and pre-
implementation phases have over time led to (1) finan-
cial dependency vis-à-vis external stakeholders, (2) a
focus on technical issues and (3) a disregard (despite
awareness) of organizational issues of the CIS adoption.
All these have been conscious and intended decisions
and actions, made by virtue of their power position and
particular interests in the project, and largely justified by
them in the present circumstances, i.e. institutional IT
imperative and severe financial uncertainty. In doing so,
CIS top managers not only have intentionally shaped
the initial phases of the CIS implementation but also,
according to a structurationist stance, set a frame within
which future phases of the CIS implementation can be
reasonably foreseen to be particularly complex.
In view of the high financial uncertainty that has sur-
rounded the initial phases of this CIS Project, its top
managers have been able to avoid making decisions on
end-user involvement by recurrently postponing the dis-
cussion on this issue to subsequent phases of the CIS
project (MHOSP1), or undertaking no concrete action
to put user concerns into operation (MHOSP2). To do
so, they have mobilized their nondecision-making power
to exclude from the discussion such threatening issue in
the current situation, without the risk exposure of mak-
ing a formal decision in this regard [43]. In effect, most
strategies to get physicians involved in CIS implementa-
tions require a non-negligible financial envelope for pay-
ing overtime so physicians can dedicate time to the
project, or hiring new clinical staff with highly devel-
oped computer skills. Under financial uncertainty, CIS
top managers have thus convinced themselves and the
other participants that this issue could be addressed in
further phases of the project. Yet the discursive activity
they have shown has protected them from censure for
their ongoing decisions, even if ultimately they were
conscious of their potential negative consequences on
following phases of CIS adoption.
Also, avowing the importance of the organizational
side of CIS projects, CIS top managers’ decisions and
actions have shown a clear emphasis on technical
aspects of the CIS implementation. This has mainly
been, again, because the dominant issue of budgetary
constraints and the dependency on external actors were
out of their control and could potentially obstruct the
accomplishment of a project that is highly relevant for
them. In this context, we suggest that the separation
between technical and social issues may constitute a dis-
cursive strategy for concealing problems and barriers
that could impede the continuity of the project during
pre-implementation phases.
Operating in a very uncertain context, and positioned
in a clear external dependency regarding financial
resources, these CIS top managers have nonetheless dis-
played the remarkable ability to create an internal orga-
nizational space for decision and non-decision making
with regard to the CIS project over time. We call this
managerial discursive ability rhetorical ambivalence.
Rhetoric has lately attracted much attention among
organizational scholars [44]. According to this body of
literature, rhetorical strategies are inherent to any man-
agerial activity [45]. This assertion would be particularly
pertinent in knowledge-intensive organizations –as hos-
pitals are– due to the intense ambiguity that charac-
terizes these organizational settings whose actors must
struggle with [46]. We therefore argue that rhetorical
ambivalence is one of the rhetorical strategies that man-
agers would display in particularly ambiguous and
uncertain organizational contexts. As it has been in the
present empirical case, the CIS top managers, mastering
and exhibiting rhetorical ambivalence over the CIS pre-
implementation phases examined, have not only been
able to convince of the imperative for their organiza-
tions to acquire a new CIS but also to select and negoti-
ate the contract with the CIS vendor without budget
availability, and commit both organizations to a long
period without guarantee that funds for the project
would be released. Furthermore, they have done so
while preserving/restructuring their powerful position in
the project.
It is important to note here that, with regard to finan-
cial resources, rhetorical ambivalence has proven to be
successful in the mid-term as the budget for the project
was finally approved by governmental authorities in fall
2009. At that time, Phase 1 of CIS implementation, i.e.
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hospitals, with an increasing but still partial uptake
among clinicians. However, rhetorical ambivalence
might not be without negative consequences in the fol-
lowing phases of the CIS Project –the CIS master imple-
mentation plan includes four consecutive phases,
hospitals having initiated or being to the point of initiat-
ing Phase 2 (i.e. computerized physician order entry) at
the time of writing these words. From a structurationist
perspective, we consider that although we can always
change the chain of events with new decisions, actions
and interventions –a possibility that is foreseeable here
due to very slow pace of this CIS implementation–
these changes are within a given range; they have limits.
Accordingly, the adjustment between technology and
clinical practices, as previously mentioned, appears to be
particularly difficult in this project –the CIS uptake by
end-users is rather modest to date, and it appears to be
particularly scarce among nurses.
Although the emphasis on technical issues is rather
frequent in similar projects [47], it is also well known
that CIS implementations are likely to fail when organi-
zational and political issues are neglected –in this sense,
propositions from certain CIS project members to create
new formal structures within the hospital to work with
the vendor in order to configure a CIS meaningful at a
clinical level have been avoided by CIS top managers
during the periods examined. Moreover, this technical
emphasis is being built around two ideas of the main
goal of the CIS that correspond to the interest of two
different, although not necessarily incommensurable,
groups of CIS actors: a CIS as a means for aggregating
data at clinical and population levels (the ultimate goal
of the Rainbow Program), and a CIS as a tool for
improving medical practices (the ultimate goal of
MHOSP1 and MHOSP2). Such different visions may
generate difficulties in future phases of the CIS
implementation.
Conclusions
Although the study of the IT implementation process
and its outcomes has received considerable attention,
the examination of pre-adoption and pre-implementa-
tion stages of configurable IT uptake appears largely
under-investigated. In order to fulfill this research gap, a
longitudinal case study was undertaken in which the
periods prior the effective implementation of a CIS by
two Canadian university multi-hospital centres were
explored in-depth. This investigation appears therefore
innovative at a methodological level because it adopts a
process-based approach and a longitudinal design. In
effect, whereas prior research exists on medical patient
records implementation, most of these studies are fac-
tor-oriented, i.e., they seek to explain implementation in
terms of relationships between dependent and indepen-
dent variables. The work follows therefore the advice of
the organizers of the Symposium ‘Doing Longitudinal
Studies of Health Care Change: Studying Health Care
Change’ at the 2010 Academy of Management Annual
meeting: “In-depth longitudinal case studies of health
care change are needed to better understand how these
processes occur and how they might be more success-
fully managed” [48].
Our investigation makes two major theoretical contri-
butions that, due to the exemplary quality of the cases
involved, can constitute a useful tool to inform decision-
making processes at the managerial level regarding early
stages of the adoption of leading-edge IT in health care
institutions elsewhere. The first is to put forward the
crucial role played by top managers’ initial decisions
and actions, discursively enacted, in the structuration of
ac o n f i g u r a b l eI T . The lack of purposive strategies for
involving clinicians from the very beginning of the pro-
ject and for doing a preliminary diagnostic of existing
clinical practices and the impact of the new system on
these practices, can be understood as consequences of
the path of dependency on external funding being built
and accepted by all parties. If evidence of the critical
components for CIS project success exists, how do the
CIS top managers justify that their organizational deci-
sions do not take them into account? The justifications,
in our study, rely on external circumstances, meaning
beyond their scope of responsibility. In these circum-
stances, top managers have displayed a set of discursive
practices to convince everyone that they are doing right
with the resources they have. They are aware of some of
the likely consequences of their initial decisions, and of
the fact that they are setting up a path of dependency
vis-à-vis external agents. Nonetheless, they put forward
a discourse indicating that everything that is under their
control is being well managed and that they are able to
change or alleviate adverse consequences that may
emerge.
Furthermore, our investigation also contributes to the
current trend of organizational studies that emphasizes
the importance of rhetoric in organizational life. More
particularly, we propose rhetorical ambivalence as a dis-
cursive device used by knowledgeable and reflective
managers to monitor their behaviour and others’ in
order to initiate/sustain the adoption of a new IT in
highly ambiguous institutional contexts. Rhetorical
ambivalence thus enriches the existing repertoire of
managerial discursive strategies –e.g. when a same per-
son (a manager) adopts or abandons particular discur-
sive practices according to context [49]– constitutive of
organizational reality. In this sense, and along with
Whittle et al. [50], we also think that “the subtle, reflex-
ive, and situationally competent use of discursive devices
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organizational change”. Indeed, our and others’ future
research should further inform us about the level of
accomplishment of such discursive managerial strategies.
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